Foreknowledge and Freewill

In the past, I have often argued against the position that human free will could exist in a universe with a God who possessed foreknowledge. My reason for holding counter to this position was much the same as everyone else's reason who held the position: If God knows the future, then the future is known; if the future is known, then the future is already set; if the future is already set, then there is nothing we can do to change it; if we cannot change the future, then there is no human free will.

Recently, however, I have come to question this counter position. I am no longer entirely convinced that a God possessing foreknowledge invalidates human free will—not that I am convinced that it doesn't invalidate it, either. So, why do I no longer see the matter as settled and clear-cut? Allow me to explain.

Knowledge

The bulk of the reasoning that led me down this alternate path involves an understanding of 'knowledge'. It occurred to me that the conventional understanding of 'knowledge' is faulty. Knowledge is not, as so often asserted, 'true belief', or even 'justified true belief'. Indeed, this definition so usually utilized is inappropriate because it assumes the conclusion: that the future is currently true by virtue of it being knowable; thus a knowable future is a true, and unavoidable, future.

This definition, not only being inappropriate, also fails to stand up against the typical usage of the term 'knowledge', which, coincidentally, makes no reference to truth whatsoever. In general, 'knowledge' is that which can be said to be known; or 'knowledge' is what we know. In any given epistemology—a frame work of knowledge—there are criteria for determining what can be said to be known. Anything matching these criteria are classed into the 'known' category. In this sense, 'knowledge' is simply justified thought; that is, it is any thought which can be supported by reference to epistemological criteria.¹ This, of course, is how people can know things that later turn out to be false. If we required truth as a condition of knowledge, then at each new discovery we would have to rewrite history, going into the past to declare that what everyone knew before the discovery wasn't actually known, despite the fact that they knew it. I find this preposterous, as I think anyone who considers the matter rightly should: 'knowledge' is, in part, a state of mind, and nothing we discover today can alter a state of mind held in the past; the present may affect the future, but it doesn't affect the past.

An example, I think, will be helpful. Consider evolutionary theory. All the evidence points to it as the most likely explanation for the diversity of life on Earth. The present reasoning behind the theory isn't important, only to say that the evidence and reasoning are sufficient for any honest empiricist to say they 'know' evolution is true. But evolution isn't true, folks. It is the year 2115, and the newest available evidence most strongly supports a different theory for explaining the diversity of life on Earth. Do we, in 2011, change what we think of evolution? Do we stop knowing it? Of course not; we have no access to this supposed evidence; we have no access to these future discoveries. And without that evidence, we have no reason to reject evolution: we have no reason to claim we don't know it but instead know something else.

And this can really be the only case, can it not? If it were, as many suggest, that 'knowledge' must be 'true belief', then we could never say we know much of anything, as any discovered truth could, theoretically, not be true. And if it might not be true, and 'knowledge' is 'true belief', then there is little reason ever calling anything 'knowledge' that might not be true: we'd be better off saying it may or may not be 'knowledge'. And at this point, why even bother with the word? Saying that 'knowledge' is 'true belief' makes the word useless; it's a pragmatically dead position.

When people say they 'know' something, they mean that they believe they can support their proposition; they have reason to believe it is true. In this sense, 'knowledge' is what we think is true, not what we think that is true.

Foreknowledge and Free will

Even with our new definition, can foreknowledge and human free will coexist? I am comfortable at this stage saying that they can. God's foreknowledge breaks down to being nothing more than the foreknowledge of any given human—He considers current conditions and formulates hypotheses regarding future events which are then tested for accuracy when the future event occurs or should have occurred. In this way, His predictions can never be accurate—or inaccurate—at the time that they are made. Their accuracy is only determined once the events they are meant to predict come (or don't come) to pass. Yet, She can still be said to 'know' what will happen in the same way that you and I know what our best friends are going to say before they say it. But our knowledge of what they will say does not have bearing on their free will to do it or not. Thus, at t₁, God's predictions are neither right nor wrong, and so the future is not bound to happen as God has predicted it, and free will remains.

The things God predicts always come to pass.

I came to this reasoning just a few days ago, and I am still trying to work my way through it; I hope others can look over this and bring their thoughts on the matter to my attention.

SR
__________
¹The particular epistemology is somewhat irrelevant, especially in regards to comparison of human knowledge and Divine knowledge, as it is likely that God has access to information beyond the imagination of humans and so no doubt, if It uses an epistemology at all, uses one that is far unlike anything familiar to the human mind.